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INTRODUCTION
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon (Carter, 1998) . After 9.11 terrorist attacks in the United States, the issue of global terrorist attacks has become increasingly severe. In recent decades, the global terrorist attacks exhibit a wider range and rising occurrence Figure 1 . The number of terrorist attacks rose sharply rise from about 1000 in 2004 to almost 17000 in 2014 (Smith and Zeigler, 2017) which implies a worsening global security environment.
Terrorist attacks have a long-lasting effect compared to another incidence, such as traffic accidents. On one side, terrorist attacks directly result in severe loss of lives and properties. On the other hand, the mental stress of the victims caused by the terrorist attacks and the subsequent series of social issues magnify the impact of terrorist attacks. A number of researchers has turned to explore the negative effects of terrorist attacks from macroeconomic perspectives, such as the reduction of foreign direct investment inflows (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2013; Shah et al., 2016 ) the decrease in the number of tourists (Sönmez, 1998; Rittichainuwat and Chakraborty, 2009; Liu and Pratt, al., 2017) . Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) emphasize that terrorist attacks can deteriorate the economy.
Figure-1. Global Terrorist Attacks Distribution (1970-2016).
Source: Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland.
One of the significant changes after 9.11 terrorist attacks in the United States is a series of immigration acts After the Travel Ban of 2017 is in effect, the relationship between migration and potential threats from terrorist attacks has become the focus of related debate. In other words, as an important control instrument, the migration policy is closely related to terrorist attacks. In addition, with the frequent implementation of immigration acts, the uncertainty of migration policy also increases over this period.
It is worth noting that the negative impact of higher migration policy uncertainty on migration. First of all, increasingly restrictive migration policies increase the risk of radicalization. Next, it is more difficult for migrants to plan their lives in the host country because the future is uncertain, increasing the risk of their failure to integrate into the host society. Briefly speaking, migrations who fail to integrate into the host societies might turn against the host societies.
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to explore the possible relationship between migration policy uncertainty and terrorist attacks. Specifically, will the consistent migration policy be more effective to decrease potential terrorist attacks than uncertain migration policy? Or will migration policy uncertainty be regarded as a supplementary interpretation to explore the contributing factors of terrorist attacks from the political perspective.
To the best of my knowledge, none of the existing studies have explored the relationship between terrorist attacks and migration policy uncertainty. One possible explanation is that it is difficult to quantify the migration policy uncertainty. Baker et al. (2016) use text mining approach to construct the policy uncertainty index. In practice, policymakers might want to understand how migration policy uncertainty plays a potential role in increasing terrorist attacks. Therefore, this paper examines the potential relationship between migration policy uncertainty and terrorist attacks using vector autoregression (VAR) by utilizing the uncertainty index constructed by Baker et al. (2016) . of terrorist attacks and the effects of terrorist attacks. Section III presents the variables and the VAR model. Section IV describes the descriptive statistics for the data used in my paper. Section V interprets and discusses the technological results from the VAR model. Section VI moves ahead and compares the difference between migration policy uncertainty and terrorist attacks across countries to provide a comprehensive analysis. Section VII concludes and explores policy implications.
A BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW
Terrorist attacks are a complicated social phenomenon. The current studies on terrorist attacks focus on two aspects: the determinants of terrorist attacks and the effects of terrorist attacks. Four important impacts caused by terrorist attacks include the decline of capital stock (including human capital and material capital), the rising of economic instability factors, the increase in anti-terrorism expenditures, and the deterioration of domestic tourism. Enders and Sandler (1996) point out that the terrorist attacks in Spain from 1976 to 1991 lead to a 13.5% decrease in FDI, and an 11.9% decrease in Greece as a consequence of terrorist attacks. Becker and Murphy (2001) estimate that the occurrence of 9.11 Terrorist Attacks results in a loss of 0.06% of the production capital of the United States and the long-term negative impact on the US economy is 0.3%. Drakos (2010) uses financial market data from 22 different countries and find that there is a significantly negative shock on stock returns after a terrorist attack. Kollias et al. (2011) different countries to show that after controlling for income variables, terrorist attacks have no long-term impact on international tourism, but they have a significant short-term impact on some countries. Some studies investigate the relationship between immigration and terrorist attacks. Karyotis (2007) points out that the connection between immigration and terrorist attacks has been exaggerated. More researchers (Bove and Böhmelt, 2016; Nail, 2016) conclude that there is a potential relationship between immigration and terrorist attacks, but the causal relationship between them remains unclear. Nail (2016) believes that immigrants are regarded as potential terrorists because of their special status. Bove and Böhmelt (2016) also mention that immigrants from terrorist-prone countries have led to the spread of terrorism. However, seldom existing studies have ever explored the relationship between migration policy uncertainty and terrorist attacks. A possible explanation is migration policy uncertainty is difficult to quantify.
EMPIRICAL MODEL
I estimate a vector autoregression model in line with Enders and Sandler (1991) in which the two key variables are migration policy uncertainty and terrorist attacks. VAR model is one the of most flexible models for the analysis of multivariate time series, especially useful for characterizing the dynamic behaviors of economic variables. In addition, the VAR model also provides a valid approach to forecast economic variables. The VAR model is specified as follows: Because each equation of migration policy uncertainty and terrorist attacks has the same variables on the righthand side, therefore ordinary lease squares can provide an efficient estimation. The characteristic roots of VAR model should be less than one to guarantee a stable condition. The optimal lag order can be chosen by a series of information criterion (e.g., AIC and BIC).
In addition, this study perform a Granger causality test (Granger, 1969) 
DATA DESCRIPTION
Before turn to introduce the data source and variable choices, the definition of terrorist attacks and migration policy uncertainty are clarified first. The word "terrorism" can be traced back to the late 18th century during the French Revolution. According to Global Terrorism Database, terrorist attack means that incidents were collected according to the following definition of terrorism, that is "…the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation." As for migration policy uncertainty, it is migration-related policy uncertainty. It is a kind of risk based on the uncertainty of future government actions on migration-related issues. each of the migration, policy and uncertainty term sets, and then divide by the total count of newspaper articles (in the same calendar quarter and country). Figure 1 further represents the relationship between the number of terrorist attacks and the migration policy uncertainty index. We can find that before the 9.11 terrorist attacks, the number of terrorist attacks is much larger than the number of terrorist attacks after the 9.11 attack.
Since the 9.11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. government takes a stricter security strategy, such as the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security as well as the implementation of Patriot Act. A remarkable phenomenon is the number of terrorist attacks has risen significantly after the European Refugee Crisis. Figure 2 shows the time trend between migration policy uncertainty and terrorist attacks during the sample period. Before 9.11 terrorist attacks, migration policy uncertainty and terrorist attacks seem to have a closer relationship. However, such nexus breaks down after 9.11 terrorist attacks. In recent years (especially after the European Refugee Crisis), it shows a closer and stronger relationship since 9.11 terrorist attacks. Therefore, I
further calculate the simple correlation coefficients in three sub-samples Table 2 One of the advantages of the VAR model is to help us clarify the possible causal directions between migration policy uncertainty and terrorist attacks. As discussed earlier, although Granger causality doesn't prove the real causation. This method provides a valid way to define the causation from the perspective of forecasting. In the VAR model, I perform the Granger causality test by constructing an F-statistic to examine whether the joint hypothesis is correct. However, Thornton and Batten (1985) point out that arbitrary lag length specifications in the Granger causality test might obtain misleading results and an extensive search of lag space is the safest approach when we know nothing about the lag order. So, I choose four different lag orders (2, 4, 6 and 8) to guarantee the robustness of the Granger causality test, the results are reported in Table 4 .
. The first null hypothesis is that terrorist attacks do not Granger cause migration policy uncertainty and the second null hypothesis is that the migration policy uncertainty does not Granger cause terrorist attacks. Table 4 shows that we cannot reject the first null hypothesis and reject the second null hypothesis, so we can conclude that attacks play a limited role in the change of migration policy compared with other factors which are more critical.
For example, how to protect domestic residents from the competition of migration in the labor market could be a more important issue. Second, I did not distinguish the type of terrorist attacks into domestic and transnational terrorist attacks 2 due to the data limitation. If the terrorist attacks data has more domestic terrorist attacks, it may weaken the causational relationship between terrorist attacks and migration policy uncertainty.
Next, I perform innovation accounting by getting the impulse response functions and forecasting error variance decompositions from a Cholesky decomposition of the regression residuals. We should notice that the Cholesky decomposition is sensitive to the order of variables in the VAR model. According to the Granger causality test, we have already known the causal ordering is from migration policy uncertainty to terrorist attacks, so the order of variables in Cholesky decomposition is from migration policy uncertainty to terrorist attacks. As shown by regression Equation 1 in section III, I follow this order to set up the basic VAR model. 
Note:
The red dash lines represent upper and lower 95% confidence interval. This study uses Cholesky approach to orthogonalize the impulses, in which migration policy uncertainty causally prior to terrorist attacks.
The four panels of Figure 3 exhibit the impulse response functions when we treat the migration policy uncertainty is causally prior to terrorist attacks. The solid blue lines in the figure are impulse responses, and the dashed red lines represent upper and lower 95% confidence interval. What we care more about is the response of terrorist attacks to migration policy uncertainty based on the results of Granger causality test. In the top left panel, a one-unit standard deviation shock to migration policy uncertainty in Equation 1 will result in the increase of itself around 0.5% in the first quarter, and then the impact of shocks dies out after the 16th quarter. So, the exogenous shock to migration policy uncertainty has a persistent and significant effect on itself. The top right panel shows that the terrorist attack shock will have the largest impact on migration policy uncertainty in the second quarter and then impact begins to weaken. The diminishing of terrorist attack shock is persistent. Furthermore, the bottom right panel shows how the terrorist attack responds to its own shock in Equation 1. The number of terrorist attacks increase almost 5 times in the first quarter when suffer from one-unit exogenous shock. In addition, the diminishing of the terrorist attack is faster than that of migration policy uncertainty the in top left panel.
Finally, we will further consider the response of terrorist attacks to migration policy uncertainty shown in the bottom left panel. A one-standard deviation shock to migration policy uncertainty is persistent with the subsequently induced shocks remaining statistically significant until the 16th quarter. The number of terrorist attack occurrence arrives at the maximum value (approximately two times) in the second quarter to respond to the migration policy uncertainty shock. Therefore, the larger uncertainty of migration policy increases the occurrence of terrorist attacks after half a year and the subsequent impact of migration policy uncertainty is also significant. The four panels of Figure 4 show the forecasting error variance decomposition when migration policy uncertainty is causally prior to terrorist attacks. Two supplementary tables are reported in the Appendix A. The forecast error variance decomposition tells the proportion of the movements in a sequence due to its own shocks versus shocks to the other variable. The top portion of Figure 4 provides the information on the variance decomposition of migration policy uncertainty. Approximately all the variation of migration policy uncertainty attribute to its own shocks, which dominates in the forecasting error variance relative to the shocks coming from terrorist attack.
AN EXTENSION: COMPARISON ACROSS COUNTRIES
To provide a complete analysis on the relationship between migration policy uncertainty and terrorist attacks as well as a better comparison between the US and other countries, I utilize the data for France, UK and Germany to further explain the relationship between migration policy uncertainty and terrorist attacks. Note: P-value reported in the parenthesis. ***, ** represent the significance level at 1% and 5%, respectively.
CONCLUSION
To explore the potential relationship between migration policy uncertainty and terrorist attacks as well as further discuss the above question, and further address the following question whether the consistent migration policy be more effective to decrease potential terrorist attacks than uncertain migration policy. This study utilizes the VAR model to analyze above relationship from different perspectives and arrive at the following conclusions: (1) migration policy uncertainty increases the occurrence of terrorist attacks. (2) From impulse response analysis, the exogenous shock to migration policy uncertainty has a significant and persistent impact on terrorist attacks.
Migration policy uncertainty contributes to more than 24% of the forecast error variance of terrorist attacks. (4) The nexus between migration policy uncertainty and terrorist attacks only exist in typical migration countries, such as the U.S. Therefor, this paper also confirms the previous study on the basis of counting model .
However, two more potential issues are still unsolved in my paper. First, I didn't distinguish the domestic and transnational terrorist attacks due to the data limitation. By referring to Enders et al. (2011) I might separate the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) into transnational and domestic terrorist incidents in the future, since this decomposition is essential for the understanding of some terrorism phenomena when the two types of terrorism are 
